By Dr Han Phoumin, Senior Energy Economist and Dr Intan Murnira Ramli, Senior Policy Fellow: As the global semiconductor market heads towards a projected US$1 trillion valuation by 2029, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) stands at the crossroads of a historic opportunity. The convergence of rapid technological advances, shifting geopolitical dynamics, and structural supply chain vulnerabilities has thrust semiconductors into the spotlight as both economic growth engines and strategic assets. Traditionally a reliable contributor to the lower tiers of the semiconductor value chain, ASEAN is now being called to scale up — and quickly.

Historically, ASEAN’s role has centred on downstream segments such as assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP). Countries like Malaysia, Viet Nam, Thailand, and the Philippines have built competitive advantages in these areas through cost-effective labour and manufacturing efficiency. Singapore, meanwhile, has evolved into the region’s most advanced semiconductor hub, hosting wafer fabrication and IC design operations, including high-end facilities from GlobalFoundries and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), as well as design centres for companies like Broadcom and MediaTek.

But the global landscape is undergoing a seismic shift. The United States, via its CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, has committed more than US$52 billion to reshore chip manufacturing and reduce foreign dependencies. China, doubling down on its ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy, aims for self-reliance in advanced semiconductor technologies amidst intensifying export controls. Meanwhile, the European Union, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are deploying subsidies, bilateral agreements, and stricter export regimes to protect and expand their semiconductor ecosystems. Efficiency has ceded ground to security as the new organising principle of supply chains.

This reordering, while disruptive, presents ASEAN with a rare and strategic opportunity. In response to geopolitical and pandemic-related shocks, multinational firms are accelerating ‘China Plus One’ diversification strategies. ASEAN is increasingly seen as a low-risk, high-reward alternative. Viet Nam has attracted major semiconductor investments from Intel, Amkor, and Samsung. Penang, Malaysia, is consolidating its role as a global ATP hub and expanding its research and development (R&D) capabilities. The Philippines is moving upstream, with institutions like the Philippine Institute for Integrated Circuits (PIIC) and the Center for Integrated Circuit and Device Research (CIDR) bolstering chip design capacity.

In addition to its industrial strengths, ASEAN possesses substantial critical mineral resources essential to semiconductors and clean energy technologies. Indonesia holds 42.3% of the world’s nickel reserves; Viet Nam possesses nearly 20% of global rare earth elements (REEs); and the Philippines and Myanmar contribute significantly to cobalt, tin, and other key materials. These resources are foundational to advanced electronics, linking ASEAN’s mining sectors directly to the tech economy of the future.

Still, significant challenges remain. Most ASEAN Member States continue to occupy lower value-added positions in the semiconductor value chain. While ATP is a core regional capability, upstream segments such as electronic design automation (EDA), integrated circuit (IC) design, and wafer fabrication remain underdeveloped. Closing this gap requires coordinated, strategic action at both national and regional levels.

Four priority areas stand out. First, ASEAN must invest heavily in semiconductor-focused infrastructure — including cleanroom facilities, wafer fabrication facilities, and advanced packaging tailored for AI, automotive, and next-generation computing. Second, the region needs to develop its human capital pipeline by aligning higher education, vocational programmes, and private sector partnerships to train IC designers, fabrication engineers, and chip architects.

Third, ASEAN should harmonise policy through initiatives like the ASEAN Framework for Integrated Semiconductor Supply Chain (AFISS). Establishing common standards, streamlining investment promotion, strengthening intellectual property protection, and facilitating digital trade will boost investor confidence and position ASEAN as a unified, high-potential bloc in the semiconductor arena.

Finally, ASEAN must deepen international partnerships. Strategic allies – including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and the European Union – are actively seeking to diversify and secure their chip supply chains. With its central location and growing industrial base, ASEAN is well-placed to become a trusted partner. But it must demonstrate political resolve, regulatory coordination, and sustained investment in long-term competitiveness.

Semiconductors now sit at the crossroads of economic security, technological leadership, and geopolitical strategy. ASEAN can no longer afford to be reactive or fragmented. By embracing a future-oriented vision and capitalising on its comparative advantages – from skilled talent and trade networks to mineral wealth and manufacturing – ASEAN can rise from a support role to a central player in the global semiconductor ecosystem.

The window of opportunity is open. It is up to ASEAN to act – strategically, collectively, and with urgency.

This opinion piece was written by Dr Han Phoumin, Senior Energy Economist and Dr Intan Murnira Ramli, Senior Policy Fellow, ERIA, and has been published in The Phnom Penh Post. Click here to subscribe to the monthly newsletter.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia.