China’s bold moves to counter Starlink’s military applications with cutting-edge satellite disruption methods spotlight the pivotal role space would play in a Taiwan Strait conflict.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese scientists have developed a method to target SpaceX’s Starlink satellite constellation. SCMP says the method simulates a space operation that could approach nearly 1,400 Starlink satellites within 12 hours using 99 Chinese satellites.
The research, led by Wu Yunhua, director of the aerospace control department at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, was published in the Chinese academic journal Systems Engineering and Electronics and highlights Starlink’s military applications as witnessed in the Ukraine war.
The Chinese team’s computer simulation suggests that China could effectively track and monitor the operational status of Starlink satellites, which are equipped with lasers, microwaves and other devices for reconnaissance and tracking. The SCMP report notes that the method uses a new binary AI algorithm to mimic the hunting strategy of whales.
Wu’s team claims to have developed an unprecedented technology that enables computers at the ground control center to generate a comprehensive and reliable action plan in less than two minutes.
It also says the research has received significant funding from the Chinese government and military, with the Harbin Institute of Technology also participating in the project.
Asia Times has previously reported that China is reportedly developing anti-satellite technologies to counter the perceived military threat posed by the Starlink network, which has demonstrated strategic utility in Ukraine by enabling real-time battlefield coordination.
Chinese researchers advocate “soft and hard kill methods” to neutralize Starlink’s decentralized constellation, which provides resilient communication through over 2,300 satellites.
Targeting individual Starlink satellites is deemed inefficient; instead, China has explored disruptive technologies, including the Relativistic Klystron Amplifier (RKA), a high-power microwave weapon capable of disabling sensitive satellite electronics. However, deploying such systems faces challenges, including satellite overheating and energy demands.
Additionally, China has created sophisticated directed-energy weapons such as solid-state lasers mounted on satellites and is exploring the potential of X-ray lasers—ideas originating from the US’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—to take out several satellites in a single attack. This approach aims to reverse the cost-exchange imbalance of traditional anti-satellite weapons.
The rationale for these programs stems from Starlink’s proven military advantages, such as boosting US drones’ and stealth fighters’ data speeds by 100-fold, and its pivotal role in Ukraine’s battlefield successes, including the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva.
China’s focus on such technologies reflects a broader strategy to mitigate Starlink’s capabilities and maintain space superiority, particularly in scenarios like a Taiwan conflict.
Noting Starlink’s effectiveness in the Ukraine war, Juliana Suess mentions in a January 2023 article for the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) that Taiwan, inspired by Ukraine, is developing its Low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite communications system.
Suess says that the project, announced by the Taiwanese Space Agency in December 2022, aims to provide Taiwan with a sovereign capability for independent communications in the event of a Chinese invasion.
She notes the system is designed to ensure resilience against potential attacks on Taiwan’s undersea cables, which currently form the backbone of its external communications.
In a July 2024 report for the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Charles Mok and Kenny Huang highlight the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea cables, which the island relies on for its internet connectivity.
Mok and Huang note that Taiwan operates 15 submarine cables, which carry over 99% of global data and connect it to international digital networks. However, its location in an earthquake-prone region and proximity to geopolitical tensions heighten the risk of accidental or deliberate cable damage.
They note recent incidents of severed cables near Taiwan, allegedly involving Chinese vessels, have raised concerns about potential digital blockades. They point out that repairing undersea cables is time-intensive, with limited global repair fleets exacerbating delays.
In line with the vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s undersea cable infrastructure, The War Zone reported this month that Taiwanese authorities have accused a Chinese-owned vessel, the Shunxin-39, of severing an undersea communications cable near Keelung Harbor.
The War Zone says the incident is the latest in a series of similar events affecting Taiwan’s underwater infrastructure. The report notes that the Shunxin-39, registered in Cameroon but owned by a Hong Kong company headed by a Chinese national, was found to be operating under multiple identities, raising suspicions of deliberate sabotage.
According to the report, Taiwan’s coast guard attempted to intercept the vessel for investigation, but rough weather prevented boarding. It then mentions that the ship continued its journey to South Korea, where Taiwanese authorities requested assistance with the investigation.
The War Zone says that the damaged cable, part of the Trans-Pacific Express network, is crucial for connecting East Asia with the US West Coast. The report says that although communication was rerouted with minimal disruption, the incident highlights the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea infrastructure.
While satellites do not suffer such vulnerabilities, Mok and Huang say their high cost and lower data capacity make them an inadequate substitute for undersea cables.
Furthermore, Marc Julienne mentions in a November 2024 report for the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) that while ambitious, Taiwan’s LEO satellite program faces several key challenges.
First, Julienne points out that the reliance on foreign partners for satellite launches highlights the absence of indigenous launch capabilities, a significant hurdle to achieving comprehensive space power status. Although plans are in place for autonomous launch vehicles, he says progress remains slow, with test flights scheduled only for 2028.
Second, he says the limited experience in space-based communications among Taiwan’s traditional space actors and the lack of satellite communication expertise within its industrial base complicate efforts to develop a domestically controlled LEO broadband satellite constellation.
Julienne says these challenges are compounded by Taiwan’s geographic and geopolitical vulnerabilities, such as reliance on submarine cables for internet connectivity, which are prone to natural disasters and potential sabotage by adversaries.
He mentions that Taiwan’s efforts to enhance “communication resilience” through satellite constellations are essential but require significant financial and human capital investments. However, he says Taiwan’s burgeoning space sector struggles to attract and retain talent, with many engineers favoring higher-paying opportunities in semiconductors or working overseas.
Finally, Julienne says navigating the geopolitical sensitivities of space development, particularly in maintaining civilian oversight and avoiding provocative military applications, adds complexity to Taiwan’s ambitions.
